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Britain is one of the few countries in the world which has had an 
Official History programme. Created in the aftermath of the Boer War at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, it was initially designed to provide 
historians with access to recently used papers in order to provide lessons for
future conflicts. The series expanded following the Second World War to 
include non-military topics. Unfortunately, the austerity of recent years has 
led to the closing of the programme within the Cabinet Office, with the final 
few histories now approaching completion.1 As one of the last Official 
Historians, I thought it would be interesting to reflect upon my experiences: 
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The first volume of the Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee 
(JIC) was published in 2014, with the second volume due to appear in 
2018.2
Historically speaking, academics have treated officialdom with some 
scepticism. The nineteenth century Regius Professor of Modern History Lord 
Acton declared that there is “an enmity between the truth of history and the 
reason of state, between sincere quest and official secrecy.”3 Similarly, Sir 
Herbert Butterfield, a Cambridge historian, stated that “we must never lose 
sight of the separate interests of officialdom on the one hand and the 
academic historian on the other, never allow the situation to be blurred or 
the tension and conflict between the two to be quietened.”4 Butterfield’s 
attack, in particular, was scathing and almost certainly based on various 
personal experiences with official historians.5
The issue, of course, is one of sources. Official Historians have 
unparalleled and unlimited access to files which have not yet been released, 
and which, quite possibly, will never be released. The issue is one identified 
by Hugh Trevor-Roper (later Lord Dacre), who said, “when a historian relies 
mainly on primary sources, which we cannot easily check, he challenges our 
confidence and forces us to ask critical questions. How reliable is his 
historical method? How sound is his judgment?”6 Indeed, as a colleague of 
mine, Professor Rodney Lowe (Official History of the Civil Service) once 
wrote, there are two reactions from professional historians to official 
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historians: either “contempt on the grounds that it is mere propaganda,” or 
“a guarded interest.”7 Arguably, neither is what the government has had in 
mind when commissioning such accounts.
A related category of book is the “authorised history.” Whilst both 
Christopher Andrew and Keith Jeffery, in their respective accounts of MI5 
and MI6, produced “authorised” and not “official” accounts, the difference is 
somewhat semantic.8 In a similar vein, the multi-volumes that Christopher 
Andrew wrote with the Russian defectors Oleg Gordievsky in the 1990s, or 
Vasili Mitrokhin in the 2000s, were also based on privileged access to 
unreleased files. Again, the professional or armchair historian is being asked 
to place their trust in the analysis of someone whose archival base cannot 
be independently verified. A related but slightly different work will be the 
forthcoming “authorised” history of GCHQ, written by a Canadian professor, 
John Ferris. Ferris is an obvious choice, given his long pedigree in writing on 
SIGINT matters, but unlike the MI5, MI6, or JIC histories, Ferris is not being 
granted a free run of the archives and will, instead, only be able to digest 
files that are fed to him.9
How does this impact upon writing the history of the JIC, whose 
records have been partially declassified in line with the thirty-year rule? 
Well, firstly, what is the Joint Intelligence Committee? Very briefly, it is—in 
the words of one former Chairman—the “final arbiter of intelligence.” The JIC
sits at the apex of British intelligence, providing assessments to 
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policymakers but also looking down upon the intelligence community below 
it, setting requirements, and coordinating intelligence. In a sense, then, its 
assessments present a picture of how the British government’s policies have 
spanned the decades.10
The first volume covers the period from its conception in 1936 to the 
Suez Crisis in 1956. There are several complicating factors here, aside from 
the breadth of the history itself:
1) The first is the range of topics. Anyone who has studied the JIC’s 
records will have noted just how broad its remit was. This was, and indeed 
is, a committee that produces assessments, both long-term and immediate; 
it has a management function; it sets collection requirements and priorities; 
it deals with security matters, and the clearance of books—the list is 
endless. The difficultly is conveying the worldwide remit of the JIC into 
chapters that, generally speaking, focus on specific topics.
2) A second difficulty is knowing what exactly to include under the JIC 
umbrella. The full Committee had, at various points in the past, a large 
number of sub-committees that were subordinate to it; furthermore, there 
were a number of regional JICs that reported back to London.11 This is 
particularly the case with the Chairman. Being JIC Chairman has never been 
seen as a full-time position. For the majority of the cold war, it was held by 
a Foreign Office incumbent, who combined the post with heading up the 
Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department. At other points, this position was 
4
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removed, and they also headed the Cabinet Office’s “Overseas and Policy 
Directorate,” or acted as the Prime Minister’s advisor on foreign matters. So,
how can these roles—which both impacted on and were influenced by the 
JIC—work, be excluded, or be ignored? It is not an easy task.
3) A third complicating factor is the fact that this is a Committee. Let 
me illustrate what I mean. In the late 1960s, the Secretary wrote, in his 
published memoir, about the science of minute writing. He referred to how 
the minutes produced would not, necessarily, reflect the discussions in the 
Committee. The Chairman’s introduction and summing up would often be 
invented afterward, and even “sometimes after particularly turbulent 
debate, we were forced to minute what we thought the members intended 
to say, rather than what they actually said.”12 How, then, can the records 
alone be relied upon?
4) A bigger issue, and one that returns us to the starting comments on
Official History, is the documentary trail of the JIC. A practical problem is the
sheer volume of information, though there is perhaps nothing new here. 
More serious is the nature of the paperwork itself: As anyone who has 
studied the JIC’s records will know, this is not an easy task. A trap always at
the back of my mind is to avoid the criticism addressed at Sir Harry Hinsley’s
Official Histories: that they were books about committees, written by 
committees and for committees.13
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The Committee’s different functions are reflected in the nature of the 
released material. Though it changes slightly over time, generally speaking, 
the material is organised in various ways: There are volumes of Committee 
minutes and memoranda; separate volumes containing the JIC Secretary’s 
paperwork; subject-specific files; volumes of Confidential Annexes, 
essentially the code-word stuff that is too secret for the normal, already 
highly-secretive volumes; and the more tactical-focussed assessments, 
including the short-lived “Weekly Summary of Current Intelligence,” which 
was replaced by two weekly publications—the “Weekly Review of Current 
Intelligence” (the Grey Book) and the “Weekly Survey of Intelligence” (the 
Red Book). The Grey Book was intended for a fairly wide distribution, 
whereas the Red Book expanded on selected items of current intelligence at 
higher levels of classification and had a much more limited distribution.14
What is the status of these records? The majority of the minutes and 
memoranda have been declassified, and these provide a very good picture of
how the assessments changed over time. Some of the JIC secretariat files 
have been released, though the majority have not. In addition, none of the 
Confidential Annex volumes have been declassified. Some of the Weekly 
Review of Current Intelligence volumes have been released, but none of the 
more classified Weekly Survey of Intelligence have been. Having looked at 
all these files, I think it is fair to say that although the assessments 
generally don’t change, you do get more specific information in the retained 
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volumes. Furthermore, there are some topics discussed in them which are 
not revealed in the declassified files. Here, to whet your appetite, is the 
opening paragraph from my book The Official History of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee: Volume I, From the Approach of the Second World 
War to the Suez Crisis:
On Tuesday 7 July 1936, a few weeks before the spectacular opening 
by Adolf Hitler of the Berlin Olympics, seven men sat around a large 
ornate table in a four storey building just opposite the entrance to 
Downing Street to discuss what was known of the growing military 
challenge that Germany posed for the British Empire. Six of the men 
were officers representing the intelligence staffs of the Royal Navy, 
Army and Royal Air Force. The seventh was a shadowy civilian whose 
background was in an organisation that had then no official existence, 
the Secret Intelligence Service. The building in which the meeting was 
taking place, No. 2 Whitehall Gardens, had made history before when 
an earlier occupant, Benjamin Disraeli, had held meetings of his 
Cabinet there. Now the large ornate rooms, modelled in the French 
style similar to the interior of the Palace at Versailles, housed the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) and the Chiefs of Staff (COS) 
Committee and it was at their direction that the key figures in British 
intelligence were meeting formally in committee for the first time. 
Outside the storm clouds gathered and as the clock chimed 11 o'clock 
in the Secretary’s Room on the first floor the chairman, a Brigadier in 
the East Yorkshire Regiment, opened proceedings. The Joint 
Intelligence Committee had come into being.15
The first volume of the Official History covers a twenty-year period, 
from the JIC’s creation in 1936 to its involvement in the Suez crisis of 1956. 
The JIC was born out of the anxieties over the military rise of Nazi Germany;
it reached maturity in dealing with the very different concerns of the Cold 
War and the threat of nuclear annihilation. As it developed its own 
personality, the JIC became a key component in British and allied politico-
7
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military debates. It was responsible for the invention of modern all-source 
intelligence assessment, as we know it in Britain today, and the 
development of intelligence analysis as a function supporting government as
a whole and not just the naval, military, and air staffs. It brought military 
planners to a greater appreciation of the contribution of intelligence, 
including that from civilian agencies. Later, a similar closeness was forged 
between Whitehall’s foreign and defence policy-makers and the intelligence 
chiefs, not least from having to argue out their disagreements to reach a 
consensus on JIC papers. Finally, the JIC was the first example of the 
development of a governing body for a national intelligence community, 
overseeing the interactions between individual agencies and departments, 
liaising with overseas services, establishing requirements for intelligence, 
and assessing performance.
The JIC achieved some notable successes but also suffered from some 
serious failings. Ironically, perhaps, the major factors leading to its 
achievements were mirrored by the factors contributing to its shortcomings. 
Its performance was a natural consequence of a committee based on 
consensus, interdepartmental working, and operating at the interface 
between the worlds of intelligence and policy.
 What was life like on the JIC at this time? A fascinating glimpse into 
this is provided by Chester Cooper, an American representative in London in 
the mid-1950s, one of whose tasks was to act as liaison with the JIC. 
8
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Occasionally, Cooper would be asked to attend a JIC meeting, and in his 
memoir he recalls the first time he did so:
I was ushered into a gloomy, crowded, and cluttered conference 
room dominated by a table covered with a green, tea-stained 
baize cloth. A dozen or so men were slumped in chairs at the 
table or haphazardly seated around the room … the owlish-
looking man next to me (who mumbled “economist, JIB” when 
we were introduced) was thoughtfully absorbed in a Greek 
pentameter he was composing. The navy commander on my 
other side was dozing … the door flew open and someone 
shouted, “240 for 6!” I heard cheers and groans. The intruder 
slammed the door behind him. I barely had a chance to make my
profound contribution … when there was a gentle knock on the 
door. The navy officer stirred himself, opened the door, and 
happily announced, “Elevenses!” Tea and biscuits were passed 
around. And then, once again, the door swung open and the 
mysterious interloper yelled, “310 for 8!” … I quickly learned that
my first impression of this group was completely wrong. Yes, 
they were laconic. Yes, cricket, elevenses, afternoon tea, and 
Greek pentameters were nontrivial considerations. … But, as I 
was soon to discover, they were bright … they were also serious 
and hardworking.16
If Cooper had been startled by his first experiences of London, then it 
is fair to say that his British counterpart in Washington had a similar 
baptism:
I was introduced to each individual member by the Chairman. …
Thereafter the members sat down removing what clothing they 
thought fit. The gentleman on my right removed his shirt and 
vest and remained clad in a pair of bright red braces depicting a
pair of very undressed ladies. The chair on my left was empty. 
The late arrival sat down and apparently did not feel the heat as
he retained his hat and coat throughout the proceedings. More 
than half the members sat through-out with their feet on the 
table. You can imagine my feelings when I thought back on the 
meetings in the JIC in London!
9
Goodman: Writing Official History
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
The significance of these two quotes highlights a number of points. 
Firstly, the difficulty (these exceptions aside) in finding anecdotal evidence 
about life on the JIC. Secondly, it highlights the importance in focussing on 
the individuals present on the Committee, something sorely lacking from 
previous accounts. Thirdly, it touches upon one of the most difficult issues 
to overcome in the clearance of the first volume; namely, not being able to 
officially reveal from which organisation US representatives attending the 
JIC were attached.
There are two important questions that emerge from the first volume 
of my Official History: 1) Did intelligence demonstrably influence policy? and
2) How important was the JIC specifically.
Speaking generally, over the twenty-year period, the Committee’s 
performance in steadying the Whitehall ship in rough water was effective. 
Whilst its strategic forecasting sometimes failed, its operational analyses of 
the resulting situation were generally accurate, if sometimes coloured by 
seeing the influence of Moscow in the Middle East and Far East as greater 
than it probably was. The inherent difficulties of trying to avoid surprise, of 
producing predictive assessments, and of attempting to impose a rational 
explanation of events only dimly perceived pose epistemological problems of
the highest order. The performance of the JIC cannot solely be judged by 
how often it was surprised by dramatic events. It is also important to 
10
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recognise that the JIC made an important contribution to day-to-day 
planning and policy.
The JIC itself was an unrivalled success. In essence, in the 1950s it 
was carrying out four main functions:
i) producing joint, interdepartmental assessments; 
ii) guiding the national intelligence effort by considering, at a senior level,
the annual requirements for intelligence, and overseeing intelligence 
liaisons and other community issues; 
iii) helping to bring together the resource requirements of the intelligence 
agencies, and lobbying on their behalf for greater funds; 
iv) and exercising a responsibility for the security of sensitive material. 
Beyond this, however, was the broader value increasingly derived by 
the UK from having such a variety of senior people from the worlds of policy 
and intelligence sit down around a table once every week, argue their way to
consensus, and have to “dip their hands in the blood of the assessments.”17 
In conclusion, is it possible to escape the subjectivity of the Whitehall 
devil? The simple answer is yes. The Cabinet Office contracts for Official 
Historians make it explicit that the interpretation is the historian’s alone, and
that their control is limited to security. Furthermore, an advisory board 
ensures that objectivity and analytical rigour are maintained throughout. In 
1962, President Kennedy, commenting on the Foreign Relations of the 
United States series, said that “the effectiveness of democracy as a form of 
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government depends on an informed and intelligent citizenry.”18 The Official 
History series is part of this tradition. To conclude, almost 50 years ago, D. 
C. Watt wrote that “the [official] historian is among things the custodian of 
the national memory. It is his responsibility to see that memory is kept as 
free as possible from the distortions of distance in time from the events 
remembered, of imperfect biased recollection, and of prejudice or 
ignorance.”19 I could not agree more.
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